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Bank market concentration and bank efficiency in the European Union: a panel 
Granger causality approach  
 
1. Introduction 
During the last two decades and up until the recent financial crisis, there was a clear global trend 
towards bank market consolidation. The global phenomena of technological innovation, bank 
market liberalisation and deregulation facilitated the process of bank mergers and acquisitions.  
In Europe, this global process was accompanied by the efforts to establish the single European 
financial market, based on the belief that market competition would increase bank productivity 
and efficiency. Furthermore, over the past decade, the European Union banking market has also 
had to face the challenge of the financial consolidation and integration of 12 new member-states.   
Economic theory generally accepts that in the presence of perfect information, market 
competition will be associated to efficiency while the existence of market power will be 
synonymous with less competitiveness and inefficiency.  
However, financial markets are characterised by the existence of asymmetric information and in 
order to prevent adverse selection and moral hazard, it is recommended that trust be increased 
through the establishment of long-lasting relationships between the banking institutions and their 
clients.  These lasting relationships based on trust may be associated to bank market power and 
may also be considered as a necessary condition of bank efficiency.  
Taking these conditions into account, authors like Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) suggest that 
the relationship between bank market concentration and bank efficiency is complex and 3 
 
sometimes ambiguous: depending on the banking market specific characteristics, this 
relationship may be either positive or negative. 
So, it is generally confirmed that bank market consolidation and bank efficiency relationships are 
of particular relevance in Europe, but they remain controversial (Goddard et al., 2007; 
Molyneux, 2009).  
There is a strand of literature devoted to the discussion and testing of the relationships between 
competitiveness and efficiency of banking markets. Most of these studies concentrate on the 
structural approach and mainly test the structure conduct performance (SCP) hypothesis, which 
considers that bank market concentration is inversely related to bank market competition, which 
leads to greater profitability (a hypothesis supported by such authors as Bikker and  Haaf, 2002; 
Deltuvaite et al., 2007; and rejected, among others, by Classens and Laeven, 2004). Other papers 
analyse the reverse relationship and test the possible influence of bank efficiency on market 
concentration, in the context of the efficient structure hypothesis (tested, among others, by Punt 
and Van Rooij, 2003; Weill, 2004).  
However, not many works (three exceptions are to be found in Schaeck and Cihak, 2008; 
Pruteanu-Podpiera et al., 2008; Casu and Girardone, 2009) have concentrated simultaneously on 
these two relationships and used Granger causality estimations to test the possible causality not 
only between bank concentration and efficiency, but also the reverse, i.e. between bank 
efficiency and market concentration.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature by using a panel Granger causality approach to test  the 
relationship between bank market concentration and bank efficiency in all 27 European Union 
countries over a relatively long time period: from 1996 to the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. 
Whilst the findings confirm the relative complexity of this relationship, they generally point to a 4 
 
negative causation running not only from concentration to efficiency, but also from efficiency to 
concentration.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical background and a brief 
literature review; Section 3 explains the methodological framework and the data; Section 4 




2. Theoretical Background and Brief Literature Review 
In the origin of the debate on the relationship between bank market structure and bank efficiency 
is the so-called “quiet life hypothesis” (Hicks, 1935), which states that the increase in market 
concentration is associated to less social results (with higher prices and restrictions in the 
outputs), since in the absence of competition, monopoly managers do not have to fight to obtain 
good results.   
From then on, two distinct strands in the literature reflect the views on the relationship between 
market consolidation and efficiency: the structural and the non-structural approaches.   
The structural approach includes two competing hypothesis. On one side is the traditional 
structure conduct performance (SCP) hypothesis, which derives from the industrial organisation 
literature (see among others, Bain, 1951) and considers that the level of bank market 
concentration is inversely related to the degree of bank competition. On the other side, we have 
the efficient structure hypothesis (supported by authors like Smirlock et al., 1984; Maudos, 
1998), which argues that it is mainly the efficiency of the largest banks that explains the bank 
market consolidation. 
The non-structural approach states that the bank competitive performance depends on other 
factors that are different from market concentration, such as the general contestability of the 5 
 
market, or the barriers to entry into, or exit from, the market. The non-structural approach has 
developed some specific models that analyse the competitive performance of the firms without 
using explicit information on the market structure and, in the context of the new empirical 
industrial organisation (NEIO) literature, include contributions of authors like Iwata (1974),   
Bresnaham (1982, 1989) or Panzar and Rosse  (1982, 1987).  
In recent years, with the global trend of bank consolidation, there has been an increase of 
theoretical debates and empirical analysis of the relationship between bank market concentration 
and bank performance.  
Until the 1990s, there was a general belief that mergers did not clearly contribute to bank 
performance improvements and several empirical findings were consistent with the traditional 
SCP statements, particularly with the “quiet life hypothesis” (e.g. Berger and Hannan, 1989, 
1998; Hannan and Berger, 1991; Neumark and Sharpe, 1992; Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; 
Pilloff, 1996). 
From the year 2000, this general consensus was broken when particular attention was paid to 
such specific characteristics of the banking markets as the presence of asymmetric information, 
contagion phenomena and imperfect competition, or the specific impacts of bank concentration, 
competition and regulation on bank performance (among others, De Brand and Davis, 2000; 
Allen and Gale, 2000; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2000;  Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Berger et al., 
2004; Weill, 2004; Hasan et al., 2009; Schaeck et al., 2009; Tabak et al., 2011). Furthermore, the 
polemic intensified with the discussion of the relationship between European bank consolidation 
and bank efficiency (e.g. Diaz et al., 2004; Fernandez de Guevara et al., 2005; Casu and 
Girardone, 2006; Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos, 2007; Altunbas and Marquês, 2007; 
Goddard et al., 2007; Molyneux, 2009). 
With regard to the empirical tests of the relationship between the bank market structure 
(represented by the market share or concentration indices) and bank efficiency (measured either 6 
 
by parametric methods, like the Stochastic Frontier Analysis, or by non-parametric methods, like 
the Data Envelopment Analysis), several papers tend to support the efficient structure 
hypothesis, underlining the importance of the relationship between bank cost efficiency and bank 
concentration or market share (see, among others, Goldberg and Rai, 1996; Berger and Hannan, 
1997; Punt and Van Rooij, 2003; Weill, 2004; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2007). 
However, not many authors have used Granger-type causality test estimations to investigate the 
empirical relationship between market competition and bank efficiency.  
Schaeck and Cihak (2008) use a large sample of EU and USA banks and find evidence that 
competition Granger-causes profit efficiency of banks and increases profit efficiency at least in 
the USA sub-sample. 
Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2008), examining the Czech bank loan market between 1994 and 2005, 
reject Hick’s quiet life hypothesis as they find a negative relationship between competition and 
efficiency. Their results support the negative Granger causality, but only running from 
competition to efficiency and not from efficiency to competition.  
Casu and Girardone (2009) apply Granger-type causality estimations to test the relationship 
between competition and efficiency, using bank-level balance sheet data for the commercial banks 
of the five largest EU countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom, between 2000 
and 2005. Once again, their findings do not support the quiet life hypothesis, as the Granger causality 
running from market power to efficiency is positive. On the other hand, there is no clear evidence 









3. Methodological Framework and Data 
In order to test the Granger causality relationship between bank market concentration and bank 
efficiency, we first present the measures chosen and data used to define bank market 
concentration, bank cost efficiency and the adopted Granger causality approach.  
Our data are sourced from the BankScope database. The sample comprises annual data from 
consolidated accounts of the commercial and saving banks of all 27 EU countries between 1996 




3.1.  Bank market concentration 
Among the possible concepts and measures of market concentration, we opt to use two of the 
most popular indicators: the percentage share of the total assets held by the three largest banking 
institutions (C3) of each EU member-state and the Helfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI) which, 
also in terms of each member-state’s total bank assets, is calculated as the sum of the squares of 
the market shares of each of the country’s banking institutions.  
For the interpretation of the HHI, we follow the general rule that considers the presence of low 
concentration if HHI <1000; if HHI > 1800 there is high concentration; and if 1000 < HHI < 
1800 the market will be moderately concentrated. 
To obtain the concentration measures: C3 and HHI, we use data sourced from the Bankscope 
database. The sample comprises annual data from consolidated accounts of the commercial and 
savings banks of all EU countries between 1996 and 2008. 
The C3 and HHI results are presented in Appendix II and clearly show that, with some 
exceptions, there is an increase in the bank market concentration. The exceptions are to be found 
in the Netherlands and Greece and very particularly in certain new EU member-states, like 8 
 
Bulgaria, Romania and Poland, and also in the Czech Republic, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta 
and Slovakia, although less strongly. 
On the other hand, and in spite of the general increase in EU bank market concentration between 
1996 and 2008, the levels of concentration continue to be relatively low in the five most 
important EU countries: France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy (the latter only 
up to 2005), countries that clearly contribute to the majority of the banks included in our panel 
(see Appendix I). 
 
 
3.2.  Bank efficiency 
The research into efficiency is usually based on the estimation of efficiency frontiers with the 
best combinations of the different inputs and outputs of the production process and then on the 
analysis of the deviations from the frontier that correspond to the losses of efficiency. 
Most of the empirical studies on the measurement of bank efficiency adopt either parametric 
methods, like the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), or non-parametric methods, particularly 
the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).  
Here, we will adopt the DEA methodology (developed among others by Coelli et al., 1998; 
Thanassoulis  et al., 2007) and, still using the Bankscope database, we will follow the 
intermediation approach and consider that the banks’ total costs will depend on three bank 
outputs: total loans, total securities and other earning assets; and also of three bank inputs: 
borrowed funds, physical capital and labour (see Appendix III for a presentation of the DEA 
methodology and the chosen bank outputs and inputs). 
Taking the available data, the DEA frontier will be defined by the piecewise linear segments that 
represent the combinations of the best-practice observations, the measurement of efficiency 
being relative to the particular frontier obtained. If the actual production of one decision-making 9 
 
unit (DMU) lies on the frontier, this production unit will be considered perfectly efficient, 
whereas if it is situated below the frontier, the DMU will be inefficient; the ratio of the actual to 
the potential level of production will define the level of efficiency of any individual DMU.  
Thus, with the DEA approach, the efficiency score for any DMU is not defined absolutely in 
comparison with a universal efficiency standard; rather, it is always defined as the distance to the 
particular production frontier, that is, in relation to the other DMUs that are included in the 
specific data set. As a consequence, DEA provides efficiency scores even in the presence of 
relatively few observations, which represents a great advantage in comparison with the 
parametric approaches (like the SFA), as the latter require the availability of sufficient 
observations to allow the estimation of specific production functions. 
Appendix IV reports the obtained DEA yearly bank cost efficiency results of the EU countries 
for the time period between 1996 and 2008.  
In spite of the year-on-year oscillations, there is a clear trend in many EU countries to the 
decrease of bank cost efficiency (particularly for some large countries like Germany and France, 
and other, smaller countries including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden and 
the Netherlands). On the other hand, and above all in the case of some of the new EU member-
states, there is a trend to the increase of bank cost efficiency (particularly clear for Bulgaria, 
Romania and Hungary). 
  
 
3.3.  The panel Granger causality model 
We will follow the pioneer concept of Granger causality (Granger, 1969) and the approaches 
developed to analyse the existence of causality relationships among variables in panels (by such 
authors as Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Weinhold, 1996; Nair-Reichert and Weinhold 2001; Kónya, 
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Where: y = dependent variable; x = explanatory variable; i = 1,...,N cross units; t = 1,...,T time 
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Before proceeding with the panel Granger causality estimations, we test the stationarity of the 
series, using two panel unit root tests:  the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and the Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003).  
The Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) may be viewed as a pooled Dickey-Fuller test, or as an 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test, when lags are included and the null hypothesis is the existence of 
non-stationarity. This test is adequate for heterogeneous panels of moderate size, like the panels 
used in this paper, and it assumes that there is a common unit root process. The results reported 
in Appendix V-A clearly allow us to reject the existence of the null hypothesis.  
The Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test estimates the t-test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels 
and allows for individual unit root processes. It is based on the mean of the individual Dickey-
Fuller t-statistics of each unit in the panel and assumes that all series are non-stationary under the 
null hypothesis. Appendix V-B presents the results obtained with this test and confirm the 





4. Results Obtained 
In our panel Granger-type causality test estimations, we will first use panel ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimations and fixed-effects panel estimations (following among others Wooldridge, 
2002; Baltagi, 2008).  
To test the panel dynamics of the model, we will also use Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) one-step “difference” and two-step “system” estimations, following the contributions of 




4.1. Results obtained with panel OLS and fixed-effects estimations 
Table 1 reports the obtained results with panel ordinary lest squares (OLS) robust estimations 
and panel fixed-effects robust estimations, both for the causality running from bank market 
concentration to bank efficiency (Tables 1 A and 1 B) and for the causality running from 
efficiency to concentration (Table 1 C and 1 D).  
In all situations, the relatively high F statistics and R-squared values allow us to conclude that 
the results are statistically significant. A more careful observation of the R-squared values 
obtained with fixed-effects estimations reveals the relative cross-section homogeneity of the 
panel, since the cross-section evolution (represented by the R-squared “between”)  is always 
more important than the time evolution (represented by the R-squared “within”). 
In addition, the results reported in Table 1 show that both DEA bank cost efficency and bank 
market concentration (the latter measured either by the percentage share of the total assets held 
by the three largest banking institutions of each member state, C3, or by the Helfindhal-
Hirschman Index,  HHI, calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of each of the 12 
 
country’s banking institutions) clearly depend on their own past levels, with a positive signal 
associated to the first lags and a negative signal associated to the second lags. 
From the first half of Table 1 (1 A and 1 B), it is also clear that the bank concentration of the 
previous year (first lags) has a negative and statistically significant influence on bank cost 
efficiency, while the influence of the second lags is not statistically significant. Moreover, in all 
situations, the obtained causality Granger coefficients, although not very high, are negative, 
revealing that an increase in bank concentration is associated to less bank efficiency.  
With reference to the causality running from DEA cost efficiency to bank concentration (Table 1 
C, for the C3 measure and Table 1 D for the HHI), the results obtained are statistically stronger 
than those obtained for the causality running from concentration to efficiency. There is now a 
negative influence, both of the first and second lags of bank efficiency on bank concentration. 
The importance of this influence is reinforced by the relatively high and always negative values 
of the Granger coefficients, which seems to indicate that the most efficient banks are those that 
are obliged to compete in less concentrated bank markets  
 
 
4.2. Results obtained with GMM one-step “difference” and two-step “system” estimations 
In order to test the robustness of the previous results and the panel dynamics of the model, we 
also apply Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) one-step “difference” and two-step 
“system” robust estimations. The results obtained are presented in Table 2. 
With regard to the causality running from bank market concentration (also measured by the C3 
and the HHI) to DEA bank cost efficiency, the results (presented in Tables 2 A and 2 B), 
although statistically less strong than those reported in Table 1, reveal that, in spite of the 
oscillations in the signs of the considered two lags, the joint-influence represented by the 
Granger coefficients is also always negative and relatively high.  13 
 
In contrast, for the causality running from efficiency to concentration, the results are not only 
statistically less robust, again presenting some oscillations in the lags’ signals, but also they are 
not in line with the previous results. Now the Granger coefficients are always positive, revealing 
that an increase in efficiency could be associated to the consolidation of the banking institutions’ 
market power. 
 
In order to analyse the robustness of these results obtained with GMM panel estimations and 
compare them with the results previously obtained with panel OLS and fixed-effects estimations, 
we apply F (and Wald) tests, supposing in all situations the joint-hypothesis 1 = 2 = 0. The 
results obtained are reported in Table 3, which also summarises the values of the Granger 
coefficients. 
The first part of Table 3 reveals the results for causality running from market concentration to 
bank efficiency, allowing us to conclude that there is a clear negative relationship, which means 
that in all situations, the increase of market consolidation will contribute to less bank efficiency. 
However, regarding the causality running from bank efficiency to market concentration, the 
results presented in the second part of Table 3 are contradictory: using OLS and fixed-effects 
estimations, we obtain a negative influence, but a positive influence is obtained if we apply 
dynamic GMM estimations. The comparison of the F and Wald tests results allows us to confirm 
that with our panel, OLS and fixed-effects results are more robust and can validate the negative 
causality running from bank cost efficiency to bank market concentration. Furthermore, a more 
careful observation of the values of these tests (for OLS and fixed-effects estimations) indicates 
that the causality running from efficiency to concentration is more robust than the reverse 





5. Summary and conclusions 
This paper aims to provide new empirical evidence on the rather controversial relationship 
between bank market concentration and bank efficiency. The main contributions are to be found 
in the application of a panel Granger causality approach, using annual data from the consolidated 
accounts of the commercial and savings banks of all 27 European Union countries collected from 
the Bankscope data base for the time period 1996-2008. 
For bank market concentration, we opt to use two popular measures: the C3, that is, the 
percentage share of the total assets held by the three largest commercial and savings banks of 
each EU member-state and the Helfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI), calculated for each EU 
country as the sum of the squares of all the country’s commercial and savings banking 
institutions’ market shares. The results obtained with both measures reveal that with some 
exceptions, there is a general trend to the increase of EU bank market concentration during the 
considered period. However, for the largest EU countries (France, Germany, Spain, the United 
Kingdom and Italy), the levels of concentration remain relatively low.  
To measure bank cost efficiency, we use the DEA non-parametric estimations and following the 
intermediation approach, considering three bank outputs: total loans, total securities and other 
earning assets; and three bank inputs: the price of the borrowed funds, the price of capital and the 
price of labour. The results show that in spite of some year-on-year oscillations and the specific 
cases of some EU member-states, the general trend is for the bank cost efficiency to decrease, a 
trend that is particularly evident in the last years of the considered period.  
In order to test statistically the panel Granger causality between EU bank market concentration 
and the cost efficiency of the EU banks, we consider models with two lags both of the dependent 
and independent variables and use different panel robust estimation techniques: OLS, fixed 
effects, GMM one-step “difference” and GMM two-step “system”. 15 
 
The results obtained with these techniques confirm the complexity of the relationships between 
bank market concentration and bank cost efficiency in the panel of the 27 EU countries. 
Similarly to the Granger causality results obtained by, for example, Casu and Girardone (2009), 
there are not only clear oscillations in the influences of the first and second lags of the variables, 
but specifically for the causality running from bank efficiency to market concentration, there are 
also some contradictions in the results obtained with different estimation techniques. 
However, a careful comparison of the obtained Granger coefficients and the values provided by 
the F and Wald tests allows us to conclude that the causality running from concentration to 
efficiency is clearly negative. These results are in line with the SCP paradigm, and the 
suggestions that the banks acting in  more concentrated markets will contribute to inefficiency as 
a result of their lesser efforts to acquire more outputs with less costs (Berger and Hannan, 1998; 
Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Schaeck and Cihak, 2008; Chortareas et al., 2010).  
In addition, with regard to the causality running from bank cost efficiency to bank market 
concentration, the obtained Granger coefficients and the values of the F and Wald tests also 
provide evidence of the importance of this relationship. Nonetheless, the obtained results do not 
allow us to validate the efficient structure hypothesis. They are more in line with the arguments 
for the possibility of the smaller banks being more effective than the larger banks (Goddard et 
al., 2001), or those findings that suggest that even when larger banks have higher performance, 
this advantage decreases in concentrated markets (Tabak et al., 2011). To summarise, our results 
suggest that in the panel comprising all 27 European Union countries, between 1996 and 2008, 
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Appendix I – Yearly number of banks by EU country 
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  2006 2007 2008
Austria  72  122  124  124 129 140 142 146 154 153 162 162  147 
Belgium  97  91  75  73 68 69 72 73 72 71 58 47  34 
Bulgaria  16  19  22  21 25 27 28 29 30 30 29 22  21 
Cyprus  17  23  25  21 23 23 24 18 17 16 11 11  9 
Czech  Rep.  28  28  25  25 27 28 27 26 31 27 25 25  20 
Denmark  113  113  117  118 123 116 113 112 129 120 123 121  109 
Estonia  16  18 8 8 10 10 11 11 12 11 11 12  10 
Finland    11  12  12  12 14 13 12 14 19 16 11 11  12 
France  345  323  312  306 308 305 295 283 292 283 256 237  204 
Germany  827  830  818  791 771 737 708 682 675 677 685 675  593 
Greece  29  35  33  30 26 26 31 34 55 35 33 30  29 
Hungary  34  33  34  37 39 35 37 33 33 36 35 31  26 
Ireland  34  36  40  40 42 44 46 47 63 51 50 47  40 
Italy  200  219  219  228 216 229 232 240 363 304 226 222  199 
Latvia  21  25  24  24 25 26 27 30 33 36 36 36  33 
Lithuania  11  13  13  14 16 16 16 17 17 17 18 18  15 
Luxembourg  122 123 117 123  112  100  96  92  93  91  92  105  80 
Malta  9 9  10 8 10  9  9 14 16 17 18 17  14 
Netherlands  64  58  57  55 50 55 61 60 77 58 57 54  41 
Poland  47  51  47  49 50 45 48 52 73 56 45 43  37 
Portugal  41  44  44  43 37 36 33 32 44 34 31 31  25 
Romania  8  11  27  30 31 30 31 29 32 29 29 28  27 
Slovakia  19  23  24  20 22 20 21 19 19 25 17 17  16 
Slovenia  29  29  24  26 25 23 20 20 23 29 23 22  21 
Spain  206  216  207  198 204 213 211 208 256 192 184 151  136 
Sweden  16 15 17 21  22 104 103 103 101 103  99  92  78 







Appendix II – Concentration measures: C3 and Herfindahl-Hischman Index (HHI) 
 
C3 = percentage share of the total assets held by the three largest banking institutions: 
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006  2007 2008
Austria  42.28 46.12 58.71 59.64  54.26  56.40  50.14 50.14 42.84 50.12 45.57 49.84  45.05 
Belgium  32.40 31.41 44.75 58.77  58.84  59.38  59.38 54.00 54.92 44.92 54.87 56.82  57.25 
Bulgaria  78.59 62.84 55.10 52.88  52.88  48.57 42.49 38.37 34.01 33.38 31.14 32.59  30.37 
Cyprus  64.73 61.49 60.84 61.36  52.08  50.55  53.64 66.62 65.92 72.44 77.36 72.89  71.89 
Czech  Rep.  50.68 49.99 46.33 51.33  55.75  54.63 53.71 54.17 41.63 42.47 41.77 42.13  40.58 
Denmark  52.80 46.74 46.88 43.11  50.00  56.01  57.17 58.36 52.60 59.80 59.06 60.89  60.38 
Estonia  42.25 40.39 75.83 77.06 77.98 80.54 80.58 80.69 86.99 87.11 88.17 84.99  89.29 
Finland    73.67 76.35 78.06 74.08 76.14 83.78 87.60 80.54 74.51 74.69 79.52 79.45 79.4 
France  24.56 27.77 28.93 34.96  34.19  35.79  31.35 31.81 30.29 32.87 33.90 35.05  36.61 
Germany  18.74 16.03 21.75 22.68  24.83  24.08  21.11 21.96 22.08 25.51 27.97 32.78  36.08 
Greece  48.29 45.19 43.02 39.71  41.20  41.11  39.4 38.41 24.02 36.59 35.58 38.19  37.67 
Hungary  39.21 45.94 33.60 32.49  30.37  32.20  33.96 39.03 39.66 37.64 39.25 37.67  35.26 
Ireland  57.68 58.00 48.35 50.95  50.64  45.96  49.87 47.69 35.84 42.16 43.44 43.03  43.95 
Italy  19.05 20.26 23.80 24.24  25.55  27.97  25.55 25.28 24.51 34.25 44.09 49.38  48.47 
Latvia  41.90 41.55 49.77 46.27  39.28  35.97  36.38 32.79 30.43 32.67 35.76 33.60  35.30 
Lithuania  51.37 51.09 58.95 70.92 69.44 66.43 64.76 56.17 53.25 51.23 50.49 47.70  46.58 
Luxembourg 17.05 16.64 17.92 17.34 18.06 19.44 22.29 22.03 21.28 21.13 20.71 16.78 18.9 
Malta  91.28 91.48 90.80 96.41  89.93  92.27  91.18 80.82 79.05 78.00 68.85 81.26  80.51 21 
 
Netherlands 72.29  78.75  81.86  81.28 80.50 81.86 85.40 78.45 65.99 73.22 80.55 71.67  64.27 
Poland  47.46 39.18 39.03 39.15  33.09  36.22  33.49 30.49 20.03 31.27 30.79 33.42 28.4 
Portugal  32.46 28.90 30.56 31.00 45.10 42.92 46.01 48.25 41.15 54.49 56.48 54.00  53.78 
Romania  96.56 85.88 60.93 63.28  58.69  55.34  53.98 58.79 50.89 50.86 49.44 52.14  47.75 
Slovakia  71.20 62.95 50.94 57.74 57.72 56.66 56.80 57.34 62.12 45.87 56.82 52.38  55.02 
Slovenia  41.63 44.77 45.80 42.42 45.54 51.81 51.97 59.51 56.74 52.77 49.06 50.93  48.18 
Spain  31.36 33.82 33.63 38.46  38.21  36.51  32.81 31.89 31.44 36.11 32.98 33.15  32.72 
Sweden  43.01 47.21 46.17 46.31  47.48  47.18  49.58 48.51 56.27 58.03 57.67 56.75  54.78 




 Helfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI) = sum of the squares of all the country’s banking 
institutions’ market shares: 
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002 2003 2004  2005  2006  2007 2008
Austria  913 1023 1281 1564 1622 1626  1419 1229  941 1221 1049 1311  1084 
Belgium  758  733 1035 1659 1628 1900  1638 1336 1375  978 1445 1499  1499 
Bulgaria  2487 1972 1395 1394 1242 1040  846  827  745  741  690  756  673 
Cyprus  1799 1613 1560 1608 1356 1278  1315 1837 1899 2199 2719 2242  2308 
Czech Rep.  1182 1160 1113 1289 1366 1321  1282 1296  935 1015 1018 1004  1004 
Denmark  1209 1106 1106 1017 1268 1479  1519 1511 1194 1577 1542 1615  1570 
Estonia  1014  997 2274 2411 2516 2867  2828 2849 3720 4025 4218 3378  3378 
Finland   2237 2335 2375 2236 2386 3767  4311 2877 1947 2511 2758 2793  2857 
France  420 455 472 595 581 601  513 537 519 586 626 649  682 
Germany  283 262 344 355 385 376  320 341 336 390 392 535  624 
Greece  1099 981 914 792 896 899  869 856 485 870 812 853  845 
Hungary  806 869 665 643 589 645  660 796 835 821 885 857  798 
Ireland  1375 1410 1071 1171 1172 1023  1129 1081  815  886  963 1006  1065 
Italy  333 326 397 412 431 469  437 411 401 591 807  1051  1025 
Latvia  907 822  1028 932 847 865  828 744 660 716 750 697  735 
Lithuania  1368 1329 1500 1944 1823 1696  1613 1362 1265 1256 1174 1079  1057 
Luxembourg  301 299 333 330 346 371  398 392 366 381 365 276  318 
Malta  3731 3759 3699 4156 3578 3680  3706 2683 2437 2370 1938 2639  2606 
Netherlands  2061 2541 2647 2569 2543 2581  3232 2620 1597 2110 2418 1895  1701 
Poland  962 714 794 687 597 731  668 583 377 612 613 645  550 
Portugal  663 584 624 629  1025 997  1103  1158  1036  1273  1393  1310  1327 
Romania  4249 2626 1733 1582 1388 1324  1254 1408 1160 1150 1102 1103  972 
Slovakia  2127 1766 1240 1486 1443 1308  1301 1330 1437  978 1306 1202  1253 
Slovenia  927 1032 1043  901 1017 1195  1218 1338 1234 1080 1130 1195  1087 
Spain  464 502 507 600 645 600  515 500 482 654 565 561  563 
Sweden  1148 1255 1243 1239 1253 1225  1298 1281 1575 1632 1598 1605  1563 













Appendix III - Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
DEA was originally presented in Charles et al. (1978), assuming constant returns to scale, which can be 
accepted as optimal but only in the long run.  Later, Banker et al. (1984) introduced an additional convexity 
constraint () and allowed for variable returns to scale. Following also Coelli et al. (1998),  Thanassoulis 
(2001) and  Thanassoulis et al. (2007), we can assume that at any time t, there are N decision-making units 
(DMUs) that use a set of X inputs (X = x1, x2, ..., xk) to produce a set of Y outputs (Y = y1, y2, ..., ym), thus 
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The DEA approach provides, for every i decision-making unit (DMU, here every country’s 
banking sector), a scalar efficiency score (i   1). If i = 1, the DMU lies on the efficient frontier 
and will be considered an efficient unit. On the contrary, if i < 1, the DMU lies below the 
efficient frontier and will be considered an inefficient unit; moreover, (1- i) will always be the 
measure of its inefficiency.  
 
In the present study, the data are sourced from the Bankscope database and the sample comprises annual 
data from the consolidated accounts of the commercial and savings banks of all EU countries between 1996 
and 2008. 
For the DEA estimates, we define the outputs and the input prices of the cost function using the following 
variables: 
  
Dependent variable = Total cost (TC) = natural logarithm of the sum of the interest expenses plus the 
total operating expenses  
 Outputs:  
1.  Total loans = natural logarithm of the loans 
2.  Total securities = natural logarithm of the total securities 
3.  Other earning assets = natural logarithm of the difference between the total earning assets and the 
total loans 
Inputs: 
1.  Price of borrowed funds = natural logarithm of the ratio interest expenses over the sum of 
deposits 
2.  Price of physical capital = natural logarithm of the ratio non-interest expenses over fixed asset 








Appendix IV – Yearly Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) cost efficiency measures of the 
EU member states 
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  2006 2007 2008
Austria  0.702 0.629 0.595 0.760 0.720  0.616  0.643 0.694 0.676 0.707 0.662 0.678  0.715 
Belgium  0.950 0.887 0.903 0.983 0.826  0.911  0.793 0.958 0.594 0.819 0.672 0.463  0.478 
Bulgaria  0.149 0.270 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 0.970 0.937 0.832 1.000 1.000  0.915 
Cyprus  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000  0.914 0.725 0.695 0.679 0.837 0.800  0.937 
Czech  Rep.  0.945 0.803 0.579 0.632 0.859  0.741 0.681 0.716 0.838 0.897 1.000 1.000  1.000 
Denmark  0.926 0.853 0.830 0.785 0.668  0.525  0.607 0.776 0.780 0.734 0.928 0.722  0.536 
Estonia  1.000 0.864 0.730 0.647  0.717 0.765 0.621 0.587 0.760 0.777 0.893 0.711  0.669 
Finland    0.783 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.737 1.000 0.687 0.677 1.000 0.905 1.000 0.845  0.579 
France  0.818 0.699 0.687 0.739 0.552  0.547  0.578 0.576 0.531 0.577 0.606 0.597  0.712 
Germany  0.948 0.889 1.000 0.981 0.772  0.762  0.887 0.934 0.956 0.776 0.821 0.699  0.606 
Greece  0.754 0.685 0.643 0.604 0.734  0.781  0.949 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.967  0.991 
Hungary  0.334 0.298 0.365 0.367 0.539  0.504  0.402 0.485 0.434 0.433 0.523 0.500  0.495 
Ireland  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 0.951 1.000 1.000 0.849  0.959 
Italy  1.000 0.872 1.000 1.000 0.975  0.802  0.921 0.924 1.000 0.958 0.984 0.741  0.740 
Latvia  1.000 1.000 0.990 1.000 1.000  0.947  0.885 0.910 0.991 0.827 0.839 0.721  0.729 
Lithuania  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.900  0.778 
Luxembourg 0.879 0.690 0.730 0.696  0.654 0.508 0.564 0.697 0.673 0.757 0.523 0.544  0.524 
Malta  1.000 0.911 0.953 0.888 0.932  1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 
Netherlands 1.000  1.000  1.000  0.874  0.764 0.759 0.748 0.852 0.822 0.779 0.821 0.882  0.564 
Poland  0.700 0.591 0.708 0.596 0.597  0.604  0.528 0.593 0.616 0.605 0.985 1.000  0.928 
Portugal  0.894 0.808 0.836 1.000  0.824 0.638 0.538 0.438 0.512 0.562 0.641 0.599  0.584 
Romania  0.612 0.596 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 0.986 0.925 0.886 0.998  0.855 
Slovakia  1.000 0.823 0.596 0.613  0.639 0.658 0.715 0.753 0.833 0.839 0.953 0.902  1.000 
Slovenia  0.803 0.732 0.712 0.868  0.856 0.842 0.675 0.620 0.585 0.808 0.855 0.873  0.809 
Spain  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.997  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 
Sweden  0.632 0.675 0.708 0.724 0.514  0.638  0.677 0.695 0.589 0.626 0.695 0.509  0.440 




Appendix V – Panel unit root tests 
 
Appendix V-A -  Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) (LEVINLIN) tests 
Variables  coefficient  t-star  P > t  obs. 
Cost efficiency. (DEA)  -0.43473  -4.25875  0.0000  312 
Concentration  (C3)  -0.25417     -5.02867  0.0000  312 
Herfindahl-Hischman Index  -0.28545  -6.12162  0.0000  312 
 
 
Appendix V-B -  Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (IPSHIN) tests 
Variables      t-bar    W[t-bar]  P-value  obs. 
Cost efficiency. (DEA)  -1.819  -1.618  0.053  312 
Concentration  (C3)  -1.762  -1.314  0.094  312 





Table 1 – OLS robust and fixed-effects robust panel estimations   
 
 
Table 1 - A - Dependent variable: Cost Efficiency (DEA); explanatory variable: Concentration (C3)  
 
 OLS  robust 
   coef.                t              P>|t| 
Fixed effects robust  
   coef.             t               P-value 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-1  .5263633         7.93           0.000          .5057128       7.10           0.000 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-2  -.1233941       -1.68          0.093  -.1189304     -1.64          0.101 
Concentration (C3) t-1  -.0963136       -1.91          0.058          -.0994759     -1.78          0.076 
Concentration (C3) t-2  .021301            0.58          0.561  .0111042        0.26          0.795 
constant  .1251456          0.65          0.515  .1898091        0.87          0.387 
  
R-squared:  = 0.6556                       
R-squared:  within  = 0.2681            
                     between = 0.8075          
                     overall = 0.4465 
  F (42, 306) = 31.25 
                       (Prob. > F =  0.0000) 
F test = 15.06 
                        (Prob. > F =  0.0000)
Number of observations   349  349 




Table 1 - B - Dependent variable: Cost Efficiency (DEA); explanatory variable: Herfindahl-Hischman 
Index (HHI)  
 
 OLS  robust 
   coef.                t              P>|t| 
Fixed-effects robust  
   coef.             t               P-value 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-1 .5275357          7.91          0.000          .5066752       7.10           0.000 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-2 -.1211041       -1.64          0.101  -.1167477     -1.61          0.108 
Herfindahl-Hischman Index (HHI) t-1  -.0669345       -1.88          0.061          -.0709854     -1.79          0.074 
Herfindahl-Hischman Index (HHI) t-2  .0282319          1.19          0.236  .0230154        0.83          0.409 
constant  .1089059          0.43          0.669  .1875666        0.66          0.510 
  
R-squared:  = 0.6552                       
R-squared:  within  = 0.2670            
                      between = 0.8503         
                      overall = 0.4607           
  F (42, 306) = 31.45 
                       (Prob. > F =  0.0000) 
F test = 15.24 
                        (Prob. > F =  0.0000)
Number of observations  349  349 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT  -0.0387  -0.04797 
 
 
Table 1 - C - Dependent variable: Concentration (C3); explanatory variable: Cost Efficiency (DEA)  
 
 OLS  robust 
   coef.                t              P>|t| 
Fixed-effects robust  
   coef.             t               P-value 
Concentration (C3) t-1  .3973741         5.21           0.000          .4034421         5.40           0.000 
Concentration (C3) t-2  -.1040931       -2.63          0.000  -.1133291       -2.72          0.007 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-1  -.1542698       -2.71          0.009         -.1454805       -2.54          0.011 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-2  -.0517916        -1.01         0.313  -.0412945       -0.83          0.408 
constant  2.644861          8.26          0.000  2.657002          8.93          0.000 
  
R-squared:  = 0. 8884                       
R-squared:  within  = 0.2736            
                      between = 0.8988         
                      overall = 0.6411 
  F (42, 306) = 129.31 
                       (Prob. > F =  0.0000) 
F test = 17.58 
                        (Prob. > F =  0.0000)
Number of observations   349  349 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT  -0.20606  -0.18678 25 
 
 
Table 1 - D - Dependent variable: Herfindahl-Hischman Index (HHI); explanatory variable: Cost 
Efficiency (DEA)  
 
 OLS  robust 
   coef.                t              P>|t| 
Fixed-effects robust  
   coef.             t               P-value 
Herfindahl-Hischman Index (HHI) t-1  .3701803         4.96          0.000           .3808761       5.23           0.000 
Herfindahl-Hischman Index (HHI) t-2  -.1166078       -3.23          0.001  -.1287665     -3.39          0.001 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-1 -.2106903       -2.58          0.010          -.2019141    --2.37          0.018 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-2 -.1084359       -1.52          0.131  -.0886066     -1.25          0.214 
constant  5.16621            8.85          0.000  5.127808        9.54          0.000 
  
R-squared:  = 0.9050                       
R-squared:  within  = 0.2644     
                      between = 0.8813         
                      overall = 0.6262           
  F (42, 306) = 120.78 
                       (Prob. > F =  0.0000) 
F test = 18.41 
                        (Prob. > F =  0.0000)
Number of observations  349  349 












Table 2 – Dynamic Arellano-Bond one-step and two-step difference robust GMM 
estimations   
 
 Table 2 - A - Dependent variable: Cost Efficiency (DEA); explanatory variable: Concentration (C3)  
 
 
 ONE-STEP  robust 
   coef.                z              P>|z| 
TWO-STEP robust  
   coef.             z                 P>|z| 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-1  -.2307228      -0.96         0.335  .2023616       1.03           0.302 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-2  -.7987793      -2.35         0.147  -.4709125     -2.67          0.008 
Concentration (C3) t-1  .4389177         0.72        0.472  -.3765633     -1.05          0.295 
Concentration (C3) t-2  -.6801813      -0.83         0.406  .0107036        0.04          0.967 
constant    1.080684        0.89          0.373 
Wald  
 
chi2(3) = 14.01 
           (Prob. > chi2 =  0.007) 
chi2(3) = 8.34 
           (Prob. > chi2 =  0.080) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 
first differences:  
z =  -0.60  
                      Pr > z =  0.545 
z =  -1.21  
                     Pr > z =  0.225 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
first differences:  
z =  1.22   
                        Pr > z =  0.221 
z =  1.58   
                       Pr > z =  0.115 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions:  chi2(8) = 10.00   
             Prob > chi2 =  0.265 
chi2(20) = 200.83   
           Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions:  chi2(8) = 10.43   
              Prob > chi2 = 0.236 
chi2(20) = 23.68   
           Prob > chi2 = 0.257 
Number of observations    322  349 





Table 2 - B - Dependent variable: Cost Efficiency (DEA); explanatory variable: Herfindahl-Hischman 
Index (HHI) 
 
 ONE-STEP  robust 
   coef.                z              P>|z| 
TWO-STEP robust  
   coef.             z                 P>|z| 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-1  -.1814663      -0.71         0.476  .1904537       0.91           0.365 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-2  -.8598875      -2.55         0.011  -.4566697     -2.27          0.023 
Herfindahl-Hischman Index 
(HHI) t-1 
.3799142         0.86        0.392  -.3570972     -1.69          0.090 
Herfindahl-Hischman Index 
(HHI) t-2 
-.3894479      -0.74         0.460  .1444793        0.78          0.434 
constant    1.180253        0.88          0.380 
Wald  
 
chi2(3) = 14.04 
           (Prob. > chi2 =  0.007) 
chi2(3) = 7.51 
           (Prob. > chi2 =  0111) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 
first differences:  
z =  -0.68  
                      Pr > z =  0.495 
z =  -1.52  
                     Pr > z =  0.128 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
first differences:  
z =  1.30   
                        Pr > z =  0.192 
z =  1.22   
                       Pr > z =  0.222 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions:  chi2(8) = 9.48   
             Prob > chi2 =  0.303 
chi2(20) = 171.08   
           Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions:  chi2(8) = 10.05   
              Prob > chi2 = 0.261 
chi2(20) = 23.78   
           Prob > chi2 = 0.252 
Number of observations    322  349 





 Table 2 - C - Dependent variable: Concentration (C3); explanatory variable: Cost Efficiency (DEA) 
 
 
 ONE-STEP  robust 
   coef.                z              P>|z| 
TWO-STEP robust  
   coef.             z                 P>|z| 
Concentration (C3) t-1  .0346158        0.10         0.917  .4237308       1.85           0.065 
Concentration (C3) t-2  -.2927328      -0.73         0.468  -.2704449     -0.77          0.444 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-1  .0789884        0.25         0.803  -.1036814     -0.44          0.661 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-2  .4414392        1.62         0.105  .3501303       1.57          0.116 
constant    3.281716       4.08          0.000 
Wald  
 
chi2(3) = 5.12 
           (Prob. > chi2 =  0.275) 
chi2(3) = 7.06 
           (Prob. > chi2 =  0133) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 
first differences:  
z =  -0.98  
                      Pr > z =  0.328 
z =  -1.37  
                     Pr > z =  0.172 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
first differences:  
z =  1.15   
                        Pr > z =  0.248 
z =  1.33   
                       Pr > z =  0.184 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions:  chi2(8) = 14.13   
             Prob > chi2 =  0.079 
chi2(20) = 122.33   
           Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions:  chi2(8) = 12.46   
              Prob > chi2 = 0.132 
chi2(20) = 22.64   
           Prob > chi2 = 0.307 
Number of observations    322  349 









Table 2 - D - Dependent variable: Herfindahl-Hischman Index (HHI); explanatory variable: Cost 
Efficiency (DEA) 
 
 ONE-STEP  robust 
   coef.                z              P>|z| 
TWO-STEP robust  
   coef.             z                 P>|z| 
Herfindahl-Hischman Index 
(HHI) t-1 
.2324312        0.89         0.374  .5899106       3.88           0.000 
Herfindahl-Hischman Index 
(HHI) t-2 
-.4062913      -1.23         0.220  -.215635       -0.75          0.443 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-1  -.0262511      -0.05         0.959  -.2495609     -0.75          0.455 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-2  .6675242        1.53         0.126  .3697278       1.54          0.123 
constant    4.37762         2.96          0.003 
Wald  
 
chi2(3) = 10.33 
           (Prob. > chi2 =  0.035) 
chi2(3) = 31.47 
           (Prob. > chi2 =  0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 
first differences:  
z =  -1.78  
                      Pr > z =  0.074 
z =  -1.49  
                     Pr > z =  0.137 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
first differences:  
z =  1.17   
                        Pr > z =  0.240 
z =  0.64   
                       Pr > z =  0.520 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions:  chi2(8) = 12.16   
             Prob > chi2 =  0.144 
chi2(20) = 139.55   
           Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions:  chi2(8) = 14.36   
              Prob > chi2 = 0.073 
chi2(20) = 23.17   
           Prob > chi2 = 0.281 
Number of observations    322  349 





Table 3 – Granger coefficients and F (Wald) tests 
 
  OLS robust  Fixed effects robust  ONE-STEP robust  TWO-STEP robust 
 
A-Dep. var : Cost 
Efficiency (DEA); 
expl.var: 




F(  2,   306) =    1.82 





F(  2,   318) =    1.65 





chi2(  2) =    6.64 





chi2(  2) =    1.39 
Prob > chi2 =    0.4983 
 
 








F(  2,   306) =    2.00 





F(  2,   318) =    1.66 





chi2(  2) =    4.18 





chi2(  2) =    2.88 
Prob > chi2 =    0.2364 
 
     
 
C- Dep var: 
Concentration (C3); 
expl var: Cost 




F (2, 306)  =    5.88 





F ( 2, 318) =    5.21 





chi2(  2) =    4.39 





chi2(  2) =    2.47 
Prob > chi2 =   0.2902 
 
 
D- Dep var: 
Herfindahl-Hischman 
Index (HHI);  
expl var: Cost 




F(  2,   306) =    6.25 





F(  2,   318) =    5.33 





chi2(  2) =    5.11 





chi2(  2) =    2.48 
Prob > chi2 =    0.2894 
 
    